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Abstract
This paper connects discrete optimal transport to a certain class of multi-objective optimiza-
tion problems. In both settings, the decision variables can be organized into a matrix. In the
multi-objective problem, the notion of Pareto efficiency is defined in terms of the objectives
together with non-negativity constraints and with equality constraints that are specified in
terms of column sums. A second set of equality constraints, defined in terms of row sums,
is used to single out particular points in the Pareto efficient set which are referred to as
“balanced solutions”. Examples from several fields are shown in which this solution concept
appears naturally. Balanced solutions are shown to be in one-to-one correspondence with so-
lutions of optimal transport problems. As an example of the use of alternative interpretations,
the computation of solutions via regularization is discussed.
1 Introduction
The theory of optimal transport is an extremely rich research area, with applications ranging from
probability theory to mathematical physics, from image processing to partial differential equations,
and from city planning to differential geometry. The two volumes by Rachev and Ru¨schendorf [1, 2]
and the celebrated books by Fields medalist Villani [3, 4] provide ample evidence of the spectacular
growth of the field since the original work of Monge [5], Kantorovich [6], and Fre´chet [7]. Specialized
treatments for applied mathematicians and for economists, respectively, are provided in the recent
books by Santambrogio [8] and Galichon [9].
The purpose of the present paper is to highlight a connection between discrete optimal trans-
port and a certain class of multi-objective problems. This connection appears to have gone un-
noticed so far, even though the proof is not difficult, and the corresponding result for strictly
concave problems has been known for several decades [10, 11, 12]. By means of this connection,
the techniques of optimal transport can be applied to certain multi-objective problems, while at
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the same time an alternative perspective on optimal transport is obtained. As an illustration
of the latter point, it will be shown below how the popular entropic regularization of optimal
transport problems [13, 14] has a natural interpretation as an isoelastic regularization within the
multi-objective framework. The transfer from a single objective to multiple objectives also entails
a change from an additive to a multiplicative environment, and in this way leads naturally to
applications of nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory. This theory has been used in [15] (cf. also [16])
to analyze a matrix scaling problem that can be related to single-objective concave optimization,
and it comes up perhaps even more naturally in the context of multi-objective problems [17]. The
application of nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory will be illustrated below.
In this paper, the term “multi-objective problem” is used to cover multi-agent problems (several
agents, each with their own objective), as well as multicriteria or vector optimization problems
(one agent with several objectives). The solution concept that will be employed can be used in
both contexts, as illustrated in Section 2.2. The examples in this section also show the relevance
of the concept in different fields: operations research, statistics, and actuarial science.
From the multi-agent point of view, the multi-objective problems considered in this paper may
be placed within the broad class of fair division problems [18, 19]. Typical features of problems
considered in this active area of research include multiple agents, each equipped with their own
utility functionals, and resources in limited supply. Solution concepts are based on notions of
efficiency and fairness. While many different notions of fairness have been proposed, the one that
appears to be used most often is envy-freeness: no agent would prefer anybody else’s share to her
own [20]. In the present paper, a different concept of fairness is used, which is less standard in the
literature on fair division, and which is based on bringing in a notion of size that is independent
of any particular agent. This fairness concept can be viewed as a version of “exogenous rights”,
mentioned as one of four principles of distributive justice by Moulin [19, Ch. 2], or of “entitlements”
as discussed by Brams [18]. In contrast to the use of entitlements in [18], the size constraint is
taken in this paper as an equality constraint, rather than as an inequality constraint. It will be
assumed below that allotments to agents can be represented as vectors, and that size is expressed
as a single number determined by a linear functional.
Size constraints can be used as a way to single out unique solutions among the set of all efficient
solutions. In that sense, their role is comparable to, for instance, the Nash collective utility function
[21]. The use of size constraints presupposes the availability of a measurement functional by which
the magnitudes of allotments can be determined. In this sense, size constraints call for a richer
problem environment than the Nash bargaining solution does. In addition to the availability of
a measurement functional, the problem data should provide, for each of the agents/objectives,
the value of the right-hand side of the equation that expresses the corresponding size constraint.
Below, these numbers appear as row sums that are prefixed.
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In the literature on multicriteria optimization (see for instance [22]), several methods have
been proposed to select particular solutions among the set of all Pareto efficient solution, such
as scalarization and lexicographic ordering. Scalarization is a way to relate a multi-objective
problem to a single-objective problem. While this paper also establishes a connection between
single-objective and multi-objective problems, and weighted-sum scalarization will be used as part
of the proof technique, it should be emphasized that the connection established below cannot be
viewed as a scalarization. The objective function in the associated single-objective problem cannot
be obtained through aggregation of the objective functions in the multicriteria problem by means
of an achievement function, as in [22, Section 4.6]. Multi-objective optimal transport has been
studied for instance by Isermann [23], but again this is different from the problem considered in
this paper, which is to connect optimal solutions of single-objective optimal transport problems
to balanced solutions (as introduced below) of a class of multi-objective problems.
In the context of equilibrium economics, efficient solutions that satisfy budgetary size con-
straints have been termed BCPE solutions (budget-constrained Pareto efficient solutions) by Ba-
lasko [24]. Gale and Sobel [11] do not introduce a separate term for the combination of Pareto
efficiency and satisfaction of budget constraints; they speak of optimal and fair solutions (opti-
mal and proportional in [25]). Bu¨hlmann and Jewell [12] use the term fair Pareto optimal risk
exchanges (FAIRPOREX). Neither of these terminologies appears to be entirely appropriate to
cover the range of different situations exemplified below. For generality and simplicity, the term
balanced solutions will be used in this paper.1
Individual rationality and behavioral effects do not play a role in the definition of balanced
solutions. In some (but not all) of the examples shown below, it would in fact be quite unnatural
to introduce these notions. All in all, it may perhaps be said that the concept of a balanced
solution is closer in spirit to the multicriteria setting than to the multi-agent setting. In the case
where multiple agents are involved, the concept represents a social planner’s point of view.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction, a formal definition
of the notion of balanced solutions is given in Section 2, along with three examples of situations
in which this notion may be used. The same section also provides a characterization of balanced
solutions. This characterization is used in Section 3 to establish the connection to optimal trans-
port. Regularization and the connection to Perron-Frobenius theory are discussed in Section 4. A
discussion of numerical issues follows in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
1It is difficult to find expressions that have not already been used elsewhere. The term “balanced outcome”
has been used by [26] to refer to an extension of the Nash bargaining solution to networks, which is different from
but somewhat related to the notion used in this paper. In the Shapley-Bondereva theorem (see for instance [27]),
balancedness is used in a quite different sense. In connection with the transportation problem, the term “balanced”
is sometimes used to refer to a property that is called the global feasibility condition in this paper; see (1).
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2 Balanced solutions of linear multi-objective problems
2.1 Definitions
In the optimal transport problem, the decision variables are organized into a matrix, and there are
constraints related to row sums, as well as constraints related to column sums. Rows and columns
typically correspond to objects that are different in nature, for instance producers and consumers.
The problem is formulated with a single objective. As will be illustrated below, situations arise in
practice which similarly call for a table to be filled, taking into account row sum constraints, as well
as column sum constraints, but which are different in the sense that there are multiple objectives,
which relate (by convention) to the rows of the matrix that is to be formed. Additionally, as shown
in the examples below, there is often a certain status difference between the row constraints and
the column constraints. The column constraints express “feasibility”, whereas the row constraints
express a notion of “fairness”. While the column constraints can be thought of being imposed
by Nature, the row constraints are man-made, and the right-hand sides used in these constraints
are to some extent a matter of choice. Such a hierarchy leads to the notion of what we will
call “balanced” solutions of the multi-objective problem. The idea is that the objective functions
together with the feasibility constraints are used to define a Pareto efficient surface, and that the
row constraints are then used to select specific solutions on the efficient surface. Under suitable
circumstances, it may happen that there is a unique balanced solution. A precise definition is
given below. In the interest of generality, the terms “primary” and “secondary” are used to refer
to the two types of constraints, rather than “feasibility” and “fairness”.
Definition 2.1. A multi-objective matrix allocation (MOMA) problem is specified by
(i) the decision variables xij , which together form a matrix X of size n×m;
(ii) objective functions given by
Ψi(Xi·) =
m∑
j=1
gij(xij) (i = 1, . . . , n)
(iii) primary constraints given by
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m), xij ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m)
where c1, . . . , cm are given positive constants;
(iv) secondary constraints given by
m∑
j=1
xij = ri (i = 1, . . . , n)
where r1, . . . , rn are given positive constants.
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A specification of the problem above can be given in terms of the triple (g, c, r), where g =
(gij(·))i=1,...,n; j=1,...,m is the matrix of reward functions, c ∈ Rm++ is the vector of given column
sums, and r ∈ Rn++ is the vector of given row sums.2 The functions gij : R+ → R∪ {−∞} will be
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable (for convenience), strictly increasing, and concave.
An obvious necessary condition for a MOMA problem to be feasible is that the sum of the row
sums equals the sum of the column sums:
n∑
i=1
ri =
m∑
j=1
cj . (1)
This condition will be referred to as the global feasibility condition. We take it as a standing
assumption in all MOMA problems to be discussed below.
Definition 2.2. An n × m matrix X is said to provide a balanced solution of a given MOMA
problem if it satisfies the following two conditions.
(i) The decision matrix X is Pareto efficient with respect to the objective functions Ψi and the
primary constraints of the MOMA problem. In other words, there does not exist a matrix
X˜ such that X˜ satisfies the primary constraints, Ψi(X˜i·) ≥ Ψi(Xi·) for all i = 1, . . . , n, and
Ψi(X˜i·) > Ψi(Xi·) for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(ii) The matrix X satisfies the secondary constraints of the MOMA problem.
Remark 2.3. The formulation as given above refers to the point of view of maximization. An
analogous formulation can be given for minimization problems. In the case of minimization, the
decision variables represent quantities that are preferred to be small, at least from the perspective
of the i-th objective, such as “payment to be made by agent i if outcome j occurs” or “part of
chore j to be carried out by agent i”. For such problems, natural assumptions on the functions gij
(cost functions in this case, rather than reward functions) are that they are increasing and convex.
Remark 2.4. In the above, we work with unweighted sums. A similar problem with weighted
row and column sums
n∑
i=1
pixij = cj ,
m∑
j=1
qjxij = ri
(pi > 0, qj > 0 for all i and j) can be transformed to a problem with unweighted sums by the
substitutions
x˜ij = piqjxij , c˜j = qjcj , r˜i = piri.
In this sense, the use of unweighted sums entails no loss of generality. On the other hand, it
might be argued that such usage may not offer the best preparation for the continuous case. For
simplicity of notation, however, in this paper unweighted sums will be used.
2The notation R++ is used in this paper to indicate the set of strictly positive real numbers. The set of
non-negative real numbers is denoted by R+.
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Remark 2.5. If the reward functions gij(xij) are modified to
g˜ij(xij) = sigij(xij) + tij
where si > 0 and tij are constants (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m), then any balanced solution of
the original problem is also a balanced solution of the modified problem, and vice versa. This
is immediate from the definition of balanced solutions, and from the additive separability of the
objective functions.
Remark 2.6. If X is a balanced solution of the MOMA problem specified by (g, c, r), and s is any
positive number, then X˜ := X/s is a balanced solution of the problem specified by (g˜, r/s, c/s)
with g˜ij(xij) := gij(sxij), and vice versa. Under the global feasibility constraint, it is therefore no
restriction of generality to assume that
∑
i ri =
∑
j cj = 1.
A linear MOMA problem is one in which the reward functions are linear, i.e. gij(xij) = bijxij
with constant coefficients bij > 0.
2.2 Examples
Three examples are given of situations in which MOMA problems, and in particular linear MOMA
problems, arise naturally. These examples refer to task allocation, statistical classification, and
risk sharing respectively.
Example 2.7. Mathematical formalization of the problem of chore division appears to have been
first undertaken by Martin Gardner [28]. The problem is naturally formulated as a minimization
problem, and the exogenous rights that were mentioned in Section 1 are in this case exogenous
obligations. Consider a situation in which n agents must carry out m different tasks. For an
example that may be familiar to many readers, one can think of m courses, which need to be
taught by n available lecturers. The size of the contribution to be made by each of the agents
is supposed to be prefixed; in the example of course allocation, this corresponds to a teaching
load which is given in advance for each lecturer. The contribution size is computed by means of
a linear formula, in which each of the tasks has its own nominal weight. The decision variable
xij represents the fraction of task j that is assigned to agent i. The objective functions (cost in
this case) are the disutilities of the agents that result from their package of assigned tasks. The
primary constraints express that the task fractions must be non-negative, and that each task must
be fulfilled completely. The secondary constraints correspond to the predetermined magnitudes
of the contributions of the agents. The column sums are all 1 (i.e. 100%), and the row sums are
given by the teaching loads. In this way, a MOMA problem is defined. If the agents’ disutilities
depend linearly on the task fractions, then we have a linear MOMA problem.
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Example 2.8. Statistical classification is often considered as part of the field of machine learning
[29]. The central problem in this area is to place objects into mutually exclusive categories, on
the basis of observed characteristics. Examples of such situations are numerous and include,
for instance, various types of diagnosis. To stay within the discrete context, it will be assumed
here that only a finite number m of different characteristics can be observed (in other words,
the “feature space” is finite), and that there is a finite number n of categories. The probability
that a given object has characteristic j and belongs to category i will be denoted by pij . It is
assumed that these probabilities are known. The situation in which n = 2 corresponds to the
problem of testing a simple null hypothesis against a simple alternative. Already in this case,
the multiple-objective nature of the problem is apparent; the probability of a type-I error must
be weighed against the probability of a type-II error. For a general number of categories, we
can define with each category an objective function which is given by the probability of correct
classification for an object in that category. Decisions may be randomized; we denote by xij
the probability by which the classifier will place an object with characteristic j into category i.
A problem of MOMA type arises when the percentage of objects to be placed in each of the
categories is determined in advance. Such a prescription may be reasonable in circumstances in
which classification is carried out for the purpose of treatment (for instance, medical treatment,
or participation in an educational program), and there are capacity constraints for each form
of treatment. The decision variables are given by the numbers xij . The probability that an
object will be classified into category i, given that it indeed belongs to that category, is given by∑m
j=1 pijxij/
∑m
j=1 pij (i = 1, . . . , n). These probabilities may be taken as objective functions; in
the case of two categories, they are known as specificity and sensitivity, and are in a one-to-one
relationship with the probabilities of type-I errors and type-II errors. The primary constraints are
given by the non-negativity constraints on the decision variables xij , and by the condition that
all objects with a given feature j should be classified into one of the categories (
∑n
i=1 xij = 1 for
all j). The secondary constraints correspond to the prescribed percentages of objects to be placed
in each category. Since the objective functions are linear in this case, we have a linear MOMA
problem.
Example 2.9. Risk sharing is a classical topic in actuarial science (see for instance [30]) and
remains a very active field of research. While part of the literature on risk sharing is focused
on information asymmetries and behavioral effects which we do not consider here, the problem
has been formulated also in the MOMA framework [12]. For a simple illustration, consider n
individuals who form a group that will carry out a project with an uncertain payoff (say, a fishing
expedition). For the purpose of discreteness, assume that there are m possible outcomes. The
variable xij denotes the share of revenue that agent i will receive in case outcome j materializes.
The right-hand side of the column constraint
∑n
i=1 xij = cj refers to the total amount that
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is available in outcome j. It would also be reasonable to impose the non-negativity constraint
xij ≥ 0. The decision variables xij are to be determined at the beginning of the project, before
the “veil of uncertainty” has been lifted. To express a notion of fairness, the group might agree
on state prices qj for each of the possible outcomes, and fix a value for the allotment to each
agent, i.e.
∑m
j=1 qjxij = vi, where the numbers vi are chosen in relation to the contributions (in
terms of effort and money) made by participants. If the participants are risk neutral, i.e. their
objectives are given by their subjective expected payoffs (in other words, Ψi(Xi·) =
∑m
j=1 pijxij
where the coefficients pij refer to subjective probabilities), then we obtain a linear MOMA problem.
In a more actuarial context, one might consider a group of companies which agree to a mutual
reinsurance agreement with respect to claims that will come in during a given period. Fairness
may then for instance be expressed on the basis of the expected claim sizes of the portfolios that
the companies bring into the pool. In this case, the problem is more naturally formulated as a
minimization problem, since the agents prefer smaller realized claims to larger ones.
2.3 Characterization of balanced solutions
Consider a linear MOMA problem given by
objectives
m∑
j=1
bijxij (i = 1, . . . , n) (2a)
primary constraints
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) (2b)
xij ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m) (2c)
secondary constraints
m∑
j=1
xij = ri (i = 1, . . . , n) (2d)
It will be assumed throughout that the coefficients bij and the prescribed row and column sums
ri and cj are positive, and that the global feasibility condition (1) is satisfied. Under these
conditions, the feasible set in decision space corresponding to the primary constraints is nonempty.
The expressions above can refer to maximization as well as to minimization. In both cases, the
coefficients bij are supposed to be positive. Of course, the two cases differ by a reversal of the
direction of the inequality used in the definition of Pareto efficiency.
It follows from a theorem of Isermann [31] (see also [22, Thm. 6.6]) that a matrix X is a Pareto
efficient solution of the problem consisting of the objectives and the primary constraints, taken as
a maximization problem, if and only if it is a solution of a weighted-sum optimization problem of
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the form
maximize
n∑
i=1
αi
m∑
j=1
bijxij (3a)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) (3b)
xij ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m) (3c)
where α1, . . . , αn are positive parameters. As a result, we obtain the following characterization of
balanced solutions of linear MOMA problems.
Lemma 2.10. A matrix X ∈ Rn×m+ is a balanced solution of the linear MOMA problem specified
by (2), taken as a maximization problem, if and only if there exist positive numbers α1, . . . , αn
(weights) and positive numbers β1, . . . , βm (dual variables relating to equality constraints), such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(
xij = 0 and αibij ≤ βj
)
or
(
xij ≥ 0 and αibij = βj
)
(i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m) (4a)
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) (4b)
m∑
j=1
xij = ri (i = 1, . . . , n). (4c)
Proof. The weighted-sum optimization problem (3) is a linear program with equality and inequality
constraints. By linear programming duality (see for instance [32]), a matrix X is optimal for (3)
if and only if there exist βj ∈ R such that the complementary slackness conditions (4a) and the
column constraints (4b) are satisfied. The set of all Pareto efficient solutions of the multi-objective
linear program specified by the objective functions and the primary constraints of (2) is therefore
given by matrices X ∈ Rn×m+ for which there exist αi > 0 and βj ∈ R such that (4a) and (4b)
hold. By the standing assumption that bij > 0, this can only happen for dual variables which are
positive.
Remark 2.11. An analogous statement to Lemma 2.10 can be proven in the case of minimization;
the only difference lies in the direction of the inequality in the first term of the disjunction in (4a).
Because of the constraints xij ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 xij = cj > 0, for every index j there must be a least
one index i such that xij > 0; for this index i, the equality αibij = βj holds. It follows that, also
in the MOMA minimization case, the dual variables βj are positive.
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3 Connection to optimal transport
MOMA maximization problems with increasing and strictly concave utility functions were consid-
ered by [11]. It is shown in this paper that there is a connection between balanced solutions of such
problems and optimal solutions of related single-objective matrix allocation (SOMA) problems of
the form
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fij(xij)→ max (5a)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) (5b)
m∑
j=1
xij = ri (i = 1, . . . , n) (5c)
xij ≥ 0. (5d)
Specifically, under regularity conditions, it was shown by [11] that a matrix X is a balanced
solution of the MOMA problem of Def. 2.1 if and only if X is an optimal solution of the SOMA
problem (5), where the reward functions fij of the SOMA problem relate to the utility functions
gij of the MOMA problem by the prescription
f ′ij(x) = log g
′
ij(x). (6)
In other words, if one starts with the utility functions of the SOMA problem, then the utility
functions of the corresponding MOMA problem are found from these by executing the following
operations in succession: differentiation, exponentiation, integration. If one applies this procedure
to a linear function, then the result is again linear, since the exponential of a constant is a constant.
This suggests that linear MOMA problems should correspond to SOMA problems of the form
(2.1) with linear reward functions. Such linear SOMA problems are known as optimal transport
problems. In this section, we confirm the conjecture that there is a one-to-one relationship between
solutions of the discrete optimal transport problem on the one hand, and solutions of related linear
MOMA problems on the other hand.
Remark 3.1. For MOMA minimization problems with increasing and strictly convex disutility
functions, a result that is analogous to the one in [11] can be proven. The relation between the
cost functions gij(x) in the MOMA minimization problem and the cost functions fij(x) in the
SOMA minimization problem is given by the same formula (6) as in the maximization case.
Remark 3.2. In the single-objective case, maximization and minimization problems can be simply
converted into each other by the usual device of changing the sign of the objective function. The
same is not true for MOMA problems in which we are looking for balanced solutions, since here
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we require that objective functions are increasing, both in the case of maximization and in the
case of minimization. Instead, one can make use of the connection via the equivalent SOMA
problem as specified in (6). It is seen that a matrix X is a balanced solution of the MOMA
maximization problem with reward functions gij if and only if X is a balanced solution of the
MOMA minimization problem with cost functions gˆij (and the same row and column constraints),
when the functions gij and gˆij are related via
gˆ′ij(x) =
1
g′ij(x)
. (7)
The conjugation defined by (7) relates for instance log x (increasing, concave) to 12x
2 (increasing,
convex). This means that a logarithmic MOMA maximization problem is equivalent to a quadratic
MOMA minimization problem. For another example, the increasing and concave power functions
x1−γ/(1− γ) with γ > 0, popular in utility theory, are linked by (7) to the increasing and convex
power functions x1+γ/(1 + γ). A linear MOMA maximization problem with coefficients bij is
equivalent to a linear MOMA minimization problem with coefficients b−1ij .
The optimal transport problems that will be considered below, in the maximization case, are
of the discrete form
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
aijxij → max (8a)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) (8b)
m∑
j=1
xij = ri (i = 1, . . . , n) (8c)
xij ≥ 0. (8d)
The given row sums ri and column sums cj are all supposed to be positive, and the global feasibility
condition
∑
i ri =
∑
j cj is supposed to be satisfied. Under these conditions, the feasible set is
not empty; for instance, we can take xij = ricj/s where s :=
∑
i ri =
∑
j cj . The problem (8) is
known as the Monge-Kantorovich problem. It is a linear programming problem; its dual is given
by
n∑
i=1
λiri +
m∑
j=1
µjcj → min (9a)
subject to λi + µj ≥ aij (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m). (9b)
Theorem 3.3. A matrix X is a balanced solution of the linear MOMA problem (2), taken as a
maximization problem, if and only if X is an optimal solution of the optimal transport problem
(8) with the same row and column constraints, and
aij = log bij . (10)
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Proof. By linear programming duality, which in this case is Monge-Kantorovich duality (see for
instance [9, Thm. 2.2]), a matrix X ∈ Rn×m+ is a solution of the optimal transport problem (8)
if and only if there are λi ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n) and µj ∈ R (j = 1, . . . ,m) such that the following
conditions hold:
(
xij = 0 and aij ≤ λi + µj
)
or
(
xij ≥ 0 and aij = λi + µj
)
(i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m),
n∑
i=1
xij = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m),
m∑
j=1
xij = ri (i = 1, . . . , n). (11)
Under (10), these conditions are identical to the conditions (4), since we can take αi = exp(−λi)
and βj = expµj . The statement of the theorem follows.
The value of the function
∑
i
∑
j(log bij)xij for general xij cannot be determined on the basis
of information concerning only the values of the functions
∑
j bijxij . This shows that, even in
the linear case, the relation between MOMA problems and SOMA problems as reflected in the
theorem above cannot be viewed as a scalarization procedure. The term “social welfare function”
used by Gale and Sobel [11] must be interpreted carefully; it should be noted that in the single-
objective problem, the welfare is served of agents who are different from those that appear in the
corresponding multi-objective problem.
Remark 3.4. The relation (10) can be used to translate properties from linear SOMA problems to
linear MOMA problems and vice versa. For instance, it is well known that the optimal transport
problem can be solved very easily by a greedy algorithm when the weight matrix satisfies the
Monge property, which requires that ai1j1 + ai2j2 ≥ ai1j2 + ai2j1 for all 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ n and
1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m; see [33] for an extensive discussion.3 The corresponding condition for the related
multi-objective problem is that the determinants of all 2-by-2 submatrices of the coefficient matrix
(bij) should be non-negative.
4 Iterative solution method
4.1 Direct iteration
For strictly concave single-objective matrix allocation problems of the form (5), there is a natural
iterative solution method, which may be viewed as an application of the alternating projections
method due to Bregman [34]. The idea of solving matrix allocation problems by an iterative
process that switches between row and column constraints already occurs in the early contributions
of Kruithof [35] and Deming and Stephan [36]. The algorithm proposed in [35] and [36] is known
3The direction of the inequality is reversed here with respect to the convention in the cited paper, because we
consider a maximization problem, rather than a minimization problem as in [33].
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as the Iterative Proportional Fitting Procedure (IPFP), or also as the RAS method. The iterative
solution method for SOMA maximization problems that we describe below is a direct generalization
of IPFP. For simplicity, it is assumed that the reward functions fij(x) in (5) satisfy limx↓0 f ′ij(x) =
∞ and limx→∞ fij(x) = −∞; the corresponding conditions for the MOMA reward functions
related via (6) are usually referred to as Inada conditions. These conditions imply, in particular,
that the non-negativity constraints are redundant (optimal solutions must be strictly positive).
The standard Lagrange optimization method for the problem (5) gives rise to the equations
f ′ij(xij) = λi + µj (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,m) (12)
where λi (i = 1, . . . , n) and µj (j = 1, . . . ,m) are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to row and
column constraints respectively. Under the strict concavity assumptions on the functions fij , the
derivatives f ′ij are strictly decreasing. Consequently, these functions have inverses, which will be
denoted by Fij . Under the Inada conditions, the inverse functions Fij are defined on all of the
real line. We can then rewrite the row and column constraints in terms of the multipliers λi and
µj :
n∑
i=1
Fij(λi + µj) = cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) (13a)
m∑
j=1
Fij(λi + µj) = ri (i = 1, . . . , n) (13b)
Starting with an initial guess for the values of λi, one can use the equations (13a) to compute cor-
responding multipliers µj . Each multiplier µj appears in exactly one of the equations. Depending
on the nature of the functions Fij , it may be possible to write down the answer in analytic form,
but even if this is not the case, the problem of finding µj only calls for determining the root of
a scalar monotone function. When values for µj have been found in this way, one can use the
equations (13b) to find updated values of the multipliers λi. Again the equation system is diagonal
in the sense that each λi occurs in exactly one of the equations. After solving for λi (i = 1, . . . , n),
one can determine updates for µj (j = 1, . . . ,m), and so on.
Convergence of the iterative proportional fitting procedure and of its generalization to infinite
dimensions has been studied extensively; see for instance [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Motivated
by a MOMA problem in risk sharing, Pazdera et al. [17] proved convergence of the iterative
procedure for a broad class of strictly concave utilities, on the basis of a nonlinear version of the
Perron-Frobenius theorem due to [44]. One may write down an analogous iterative procedure for
optimal transport problems, or equivalently for their multi-objective counterparts. While in this
case the objective functions are linear rather than strictly concave, the iterative procedure can still
be followed; however, as will be seen below, the procedure is not effective as a solution method.
Nevertheless, the iteration in the linear case is worked out below, because it sheds light on the
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behavior of regularized versions.
We follow the MOMA viewpoint, which leads naturally to a multiplicative formulation. Itera-
tion takes place between the utility weights αi and the multipliers βj . Starting with positive initial
values for the weights αi (for example, one might choose αi = 1 for all i), the multipliers βj are
to be found from the conditions for optimality of the weighted-sum problem (4a) and the column
constraints. It is easily verified that, given a vector of weights α, the vector of multipliers β is such
that (4a) as well as the column constraints are satisfied for some xij if and only if βj = maxi αibij
for j = 1, . . . ,m. Likewise, given a vector of multipliers β, the vector of weights α is such that
(4a) as well as the row constraints are satisfied for some xij if and only if αi = minj βj/bij for
i = 1, . . . , n. This leads to the iteration α(k+1) = ϕ(α(k)), where the mapping ϕ from Rn+ into
itself is defined by ϕ(α) = αˆ with
βj = max
i
αibij (j = 1, . . . ,m), αˆi = min
j
βj/bij (i = 1, . . . , n). (14)
The behavior of this iterative procedure may be understood as follows. The update α
(k+1)
i is such
that
min
j
maxi α
(k)
i bij
α
(k+1)
i bij
= 1.
In other words, the new vector of weights α
(k+1)
i is determined such that α
(k+1)
i bij ≤ maxi α(k)i bij
for all j, with equality for at least one value of j. The quantity maxi α
(k)
i bij may be called the
column maximum for column j in the row-scaled matrix with elements α
(k)
i bij . If row i in this
matrix does not contain an element whose value is equal to the column maximum, then the row
will receive a renewed scaling by multiplication by α
(k+1)
i , so that the column maximum will be
achieved. The renewed scaling is the minimal one which has this effect, and therefore it does not
affect the value of any of the column maxima. After one iteration, each row in the row-scaled
matrix contains a column maximal element, and the iteration arrives at a fixed point.
While convergence therefore takes place after at most one step, there are many fixed points.
Any row scaling which is such that every row contains a column maximal element corresponds to
a fixed point of the iteration. Moreover, the decision matrix cannot be written as a function of
the weights αi and the multipliers βj , in contrast to the strictly concave case.
4.2 Regularization
A possible solution to remedy the unsatisfactory behavior of the direct iterative algorithm for the
optimal transport problem as discussed above is to apply regularization. Here, we consider an
additive regularization of the optimal transport problem, and we aim at finding the corresponding
regularization in the multi-objective framework. In order to regularize, one can replace the linear
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reward functions aijxij by concavified versions
fij(xij , η) = aijxij + ηf1(xij) (15)
where the regularization parameter (or “temperature”) η is a small positive number, and the
regularization function f1(x) is strictly concave. The optimization problem defined by these reg-
ularized reward functions is strictly concave, and the relation (6) can be used to determine the
corresponding multi-objective problem. Defining the function g1(x) (up to an irrelevant constant)
from the regularization function f1(x) by log g
′
1(x) = f
′
1(x) as in (6), one finds that the MOMA
regularization corresponding to (16) is given by
gij(xij , η) = bijgη(xij) (16)
where bij = exp(aij) and the function gη(x) satisfies
log g′η(x) = η log g
′
1(x). (17)
The relation (17) has a straightforward interpretation in terms of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of
risk aversion. The Arrow-Pratt risk aversion function rη(x) associated to the utility function gη(x)
is given by rη(x) = −g′′η (x)/g′η(x). With this definition, the relation (17) is equivalent (up to an
irrelevant constant) to
rη(x) = ηr1(x). (18)
This shows a rather natural relation between the risk aversion functions corresponding to gη and
g1.
A regularization function that is frequently chosen for the optimal transport problem is the
entropic function given by
f1(x) = −x log x (19)
[13, 14, 45, 9]. Up to a positive factor, which we can ignore on the basis of Remark 2.5, the
corresponding regularization of the MOMA problem is g1(x) = 1/x. From (17), it follows that the
MOMA regularization in this case can be written as
gij(xij ; η) = bij
x1−ηij
1− η . (20)
The function that appears here is known as power utility, or also as isoelastic utility or CRRA
utility (constant relative risk aversion). It is seen, therefore, that entropic regularization of the
optimal transport problem corresponds to isoelastic regularization of the corresponding multi-
objective matrix allocation problem.
In the case of entropic regularization of optimal transport problems, or, equivalently, isoelastic
regularizations of linear MOMA problems, the iterative algorithm based on (13a–13b) specializes
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as follows. Working from the multiplicative form, the k-th iterate x
(k)
ij is determined in terms of
the corresponding iterates of the multiplicative parameters by4
α
(k)
i g
′
ij
(
x
(k)
ij
)
= β
(k)
j .
In the special case (20), this produces
x
(k)
ij =
(
α
(k)
i bij
β
(k)
j
)1/η
.
Applying the column and row constraints successively leads to the iteration mapping ϕη from
Rn+ \ {0} into Rn++ defined by ϕη(α) = αˆ, where the vector αˆ is obtained from
βj =
‖α·b·j‖1/η
cηj
(j = 1, . . . ,m), αˆi =
rηi
‖bi·/β·‖1/η (i = 1, . . . , n). (21)
Here, ‖·‖p (with p = 1/η) refers to the usual vector p-norm ‖x‖p =
(∑n
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
. The notations
α·b·j and bi·/β· are used to indicate the n-vector with entries αibij (i = 1, . . . , n) and the m-vector
with entries bij/βj (j = 1, . . . ,m) respectively. In the limit, as the regularization parameter η
tends to 0, the update mappings that are defined here converge to the ones in (14).
Remark 4.1. The update equations in (21) can equivalently be written as follows:
β
1/η
j =
∑
i(αibij)
1/η
cj
, αˆ
1/η
i =
ri∑
j(bij/βj)
1/η
. (22)
Instead of computing the sequences α
(k)
i and β
(k)
j , one can therefore also process the iteration
with the sequences α˜
(k)
i :=
(
α
(k)
i
)1/η
and β˜
(k)
j :=
(
β
(k)
j
)1/η
. This alternative form of the iteration
algorithm is the one presented by Benamou et al. [14]. It coincides with the IPFP algorithm,
applied to the matrix with entries b
1/η
ij = exp(aij/η). The advantages and disadvantages of
various possible formulations are discussed below in Section 5.
Remark 4.2. As noted above, the IPFP algorithm corresponds to a SOMA minimization problem
in which the cost function is given by relative entropy. It is readily verified, via the differentiation-
exponentiation-integration route (6), that the related MOMA minimization problems refers to
agents whose utility functions are quadratic. There is some historical interest to this observation.
The IPFP method was presented in 1940 by Deming and Stephan [36] as an algorithm that
achieves a best approximation in the quadratic sense to a given matrix, subject to the row and
column constraints. The authors soon discovered, however, that their claim was mistaken [46].
Decades later, it was established by Ireland and Kullback [39] that the approximation computed
via IPFP is optimal in the sense of Kullback-Leibler divergence (relative entropy), rather than
in the quadratic sense. The error in [36] may be softened a bit by the observation that, in the
MOMA interpretation, IPFP does solve a quadratic minimization problem.
4Usage of the notation α and β here is in line with the notation in Section 2.3.
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4.3 Perron-Frobenius analysis
The mapping (21), when extended to take the value 0 at 0, is a homogeneous mapping of the
nonnegative cone into itself. The convergence behavior of iterations defined by such mappings
has been studied extensively, both in finite-dimensional and in infinite-dimensional spaces; see for
instance [47, 48, 49, 16, 50]. A key tool in this literature is the Hilbert metric, which is defined
for positive vectors of equal length by
d(x, y) = log
maxi xi/yi
mini xi/yi
. (23)
The Hilbert metric is in fact only a pseudo-metric on the positive cone, since points of the same
ray have distance zero, but on the open unit simplex it is a true metric. The use of this metric
for the study of eigenvectors of positive linear mappings was initiated in [51], while its application
to nonlinear mappings starts with [52]. The purpose of this section is to show how a result of
Oshime [44] in nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory can be used to prove with little effort that the
iteration (21) converges to a unique (up to a positive multiplicative factor) fixed point. This follows
the development in [17], but the proof can be much shorter in the present case. The approach
facilitates comparison with the ineffective iteration (14).
The notion of nonsectionality is needed, which may be thought of as a nonlinear version of the
well known irreducibility condition of linear Perron-Frobenius theory. It is defined as follows. In
the definition below, the notation xR where x is an n-vector and R is a subset of the index set
{1, . . . , n} denotes the subvector with entries xi, i ∈ R.
Definition 4.3. [44] A mapping ϕ of Rn+ into itself is nonsectional if, for every decomposition of
the index set {1, . . . , n} into two complementary nonempty subsets R and S, there exists s ∈ S
such that
(i) (ϕ(x))s > (ϕ(y))s for all x, y ∈ Rn+ such that xR > yR and xS = yS > 0;
(ii) (ϕ(xk))s →∞ for all sequences (xk)k=1,2,... in Rn+ such that xkR →∞, while xkS is fixed and
positive.
The following theorem, as cited in [17], can be used to prove uniqueness of the fixed points of
the iteration defined by (21).
Theorem 4.4. [44, Thm. 8, Remark 2] If a mapping ϕ from Rn+ into itself is continuous, mono-
tone, homogeneous, and nonsectional, then the mapping ϕ has a positive eigenvector, which is
unique up to scalar multiplication, with a positive associated eigenvalue. In other words, there
exist a constant θ∗ > 0 and a vector x∗ ∈ Rn++ such that ϕ(x∗) = θ∗x∗, and if θ > 0 and x ∈ Rn++
are such that ϕ(x) = θx, then x is a scalar multiple of x∗.
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The existence of a unique positive eigenvector to the mapping defined by (21) does not imme-
diately imply the existence of a fixed point; it needs to be shown that the corresponding eigenvalue
is 1. This follows from the global feasibility constraint (cf. similar arguments in [53, p. 246] and
[17]).
Lemma 4.5. If, in the iteration mapping (21), we have αˆ = θα for α ∈ Rn \ {0}, then θ = 1.
Proof. The equations that define αˆ from β and β from α, written in implicit form, are
m∑
j=1
( αˆibij
βj
)1/η
= ri ,
n∑
i=1
(αibij
βj
)1/η
= cj .
The global feasibility constraint
∑
i ri =
∑
j cj therefore implies that
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
( αˆibij
βj
)1/η
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(αibij
βj
)1/η
.
Consequently, if αˆ = θα, then θ must be equal to 1.
We can verify the conditions in Thm. 4.4 for the mapping defined in (21), and compare them
to the properties of the update mapping defined by (14). A mapping ϕ from (a subset of) Rn1
to Rn2 is said to be strongly monotone if the conditions xi ≥ yi for i = 1, . . . , n1 and xi > yi for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , n1} imply (ϕ(x))i > (ϕ(y))i for all i = 1, . . . , n2.
Proposition 4.6. The mapping from the non-negative cone R+ to itself defined by (14) is contin-
uous, monotone, and homogeneous. The mapping (21) from R+ into itself is continuous, strongly
monotone, homogeneous, and nonsectional.
Proof. Continuity, monotonicity, and homogeneity are immediate from the definitions, both for
the non-regularized mapping and for the regularized version. To show strong monotonicity in
the case of (21), note that, due to the assumed positiveness of all coefficients bij , an increase of
any of the components of the weight vector α implies an increase of all of the components of the
vector β, which in its turn implies an increase of all components of the image vector αˆ. Strong
monotonicity implies that condition (i) in the definition of nonsectionality is satisfied. Moreover,
when one of the components of α tends to infinity, the same is true for all of the components of
β, and consequently for all of the components of αˆ. This shows that condition (ii) is satisfied by
the mapping (21).
Corollary 4.7. The mapping ϕη defined by (21) has a unique (up to multiplication by a positive
constant) fixed point in Rn++. For any initial point α(0) in Rn+ \ {0}, the sequence of normalized
iterates defined by α(k+1) = ϕη(α
(k))/‖ϕη(α(k))‖1 converges to the unique fixed point on the open
unit simplex.
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Proof. The first claim follows from Prop. 4.6 and Thm. 4.4. By a basic result in Perron-Frobenius
theory (see for instance [16, Ch. 2] and [17, Lemma 4.4]), a homogeneous and strongly monotone
mapping from the positive cone into itself is contractive in the sense of the Hilbert metric. Given
the uniqueness of the fixed point, convergence of the iteration then follows from a result of Nadler
[54] (see also [17, Cor. 5.4]).
The non-regularized mapping (14) does not satisfy the property of nonsectionality. Indeed,
otherwise uniqueness of a fixed point would follow as in the corollary above, whereas it has already
been argued that the mapping (14) has many fixed points, which are not related to each other by
multiplication by a positive constant. To see the violation of nonsectionality more directly, consider
a point α ∈ Rn++ in which the first component α1 is large relative to the other components, so that,
for all j, α1b1j > αibij for i = 2, . . . , n. A sufficiently small increase of the components α2, . . . , αn
will then have no effect on any of the parameters βj defined in (14), and consequently there is no
effect on the update αˆ either. This means that condition (i) in the definition of nonsectionality is
not satisfied with S = {1} and R = {2, . . . , n}. It also follows that the mapping defined by (14)
is not strongly monotone.
5 Numerics
Alternative implementations of the regularization method for optimal transport problems can
be derived from (21) and from (22). These formulas are mathematically equivalent, but the
corresponding implementations may differ in their numerical properties, especially when the reg-
ularization parameter is close to 0. As noted in [14], when the parameter η is very small, the
computation of a number of the form b1/η may lead to numerical overflow or underflow. Such
problems are less likely in the implementation (21), which uses the operations of raising a number
to the power η and computing the p-norm of a vector with p = 1/η; both of these operations can
be implemented without the creation of intermediate results that are very large or very small.5
There are different forms of the IPFP algorithm. It can be written in a vector iteration form,
starting from a given positive initial matrix (x
(0)
ij ) and a positive initial vector u
(0):
v
(k+1)
j =
cj∑
i u
(k)
i x
(0)
ij
, u
(k+1)
i =
ri∑
j x
(0)
ij v
(k+1)
j
, x
(k+1)
ij = u
(k+1)
i x
(0)
ij v
(k+1)
j . (24)
Alternatively, a matrix iteration can be used:
x
(k+ 12 )
ij = x
(k)
ij
cj∑
i x
(k)
ij
, x
(k+1)
ij =
ri∑
j x
(k+ 12 )
ij
x
(k+ 12 )
ij . (25)
5The size of the machine epsilon still imposes a bound on how small the parameter η can be made. As soon
as the 1/η-norms that are computed become numerically equal to ∞-norms, and numbers raised to the power η
become numerically equal to 1, the algorithm (21) degenerates into the ineffective non-regularized version (14).
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It can be verified immediately that, if the initial vector u(0) is chosen such that u
(0)
i = 1 for
all i, the two recursions produce the same sequence of matrices x
(k)
ij . One might say that (24)
presents a cumulative form of the computation, whereas (25) is the corresponding incremental
form. Corresponding to the vector recursion (21), a matrix iteration can analogously be defined
as follows. Starting from a given matrix (z
(0)
ij ), define
z
(k+ 12 )
ij = s
(k)
j z
(k)
ij , z
(k+1)
ij = t
(k)
i z
(k+ 12 )
ij (26)
where the incremental multipliers s(k) ∈ Rm and t(k) ∈ Rn are given by
s
(k)
j =
cηj
‖z(k)·j ‖1/η
, t
(k)
i =
rηi
‖z(k+ 12 )i· ‖1/η
. (27)
The matrices (z
(k)
ij ) relate to the matrices (x
(k)
ij ) as defined in (21) via xij = z
1/η
ij . Starting from the
initialization zij = bij , one can therefore iterate the matrices (zij), and extract the approximate
solution of the optimal transport problem (xij) at the end.
Extracting the approximate solution only at the end raises the question how to monitor the
quality of the solution in intermediate stages, in order to obtain a stopping criterion for the
iteration. By construction of the algorithm, after each full step, the row sums of the matrix (x
(k)
ij )
are equal to the prescribed row sums ri, up to machine precision. Therefore, it is natural to
measure the accuracy of the solution by the deviation of the column sums from the prescribed
values cj . From the equality
∑m
j=1 xij = ri for all i, it follows that
∑m
j=1
∑n
i=1 xij =
∑m
j=1 cj .
Consequently, the Hilbert metric can be used as a valid distance measure between the vector of
column sums of the approximate solution and the vector c. We have
d
( n∑
i=1
x
(k)
i· , c
)
= log
maxj
(∑
i x
(k)
ij
)
/cj
minj
(∑
i x
(k)
ij
)
/cj
= log
maxj
(‖z(k)·j ‖1/η/cηj )1/η
minj
(‖z(k)·j ‖1/η/cηj )1/η
=
1
η
log
maxj ‖z(k)·j ‖1/η/cηj
minj ‖z(k)·j ‖1/η/cηj
=
1
η
log
maxj s
(k)
j
minj s
(k)
j
=
1
η
d(s(k),1) (28)
where s
(k)
j is defined in (27), and 1 is the all-ones vector. Computation of the Hilbert metric is
therefore an easy byproduct of the updating rules (26–27), and one can monitor the progress of
the convergence without actually computing the intermediate approximate solutions (x
(k)
ij ).
As noted above, the non-regularized vector iteration (14) can have at most one nontrivial step.
In this step, it produces a row balancing ensuring that every row of the weight matrix (bij) contains
at least one element that is maximal among all elements in the column that it belongs to. From
a numerical perspective, this type of row equilibration is possibly useful.
An iterative algorithm to solve the regularized version of the optimal transport problem may
now be written as follows. Inputs to the computation are: the weight matrix (aij); the column
sums cj ; the row sums ri; the chosen regularization parameter η; and, finally, the tolerance level
that is chosen as a stopping criterion for the iteration.
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Figure 1: Problem data
1. Define bij = exp(aij).
2. Define bˆij = αibij , with αi = minj
(
(maxi bij)/bij
)
(preliminary row equilibration).
3. Initialize
(
z
(0)
ij
)
= (bˆij).
4. Carry out the iteration (26–27), until the quantity 1η log
(
(maxj s
(k)
j )/(minj s
(k)
j )
)
is less than
the chosen tolerance level.
5. Compute the approximate solution by xij =
(
z
(k)
ij
)1/η
, where k is the index of the final
iteration step.
Numerical results for a test problem are shown in the figures below. The weight matrix is
defined by a discretization, on a grid of size 256 × 256, of the function a(x, y) = sin(4pi((x −
0.5)2 + (y − 0.5)2)) defined on the unit square. Marginals are given by scaled discretizations of
the functions c(x) = |x− 0.5| and r(y) = |y− 0.5|. Fig. 1 gives a visual description of the problem
data (darker cells correspond to higher values of aij). The results of computations are shown in
Fig. 2 for η = 10−2, η = 10−3, and η = 10−4. The tolerance level is set at 0.01 in each case.
CPU time per iteration step is mainly determined by the grid size, and is not influenced much by
the choice of the regularization parameter η. However, the number of iteration steps required to
reach a given level of convergence appears to be approximately inversely proportional to η. The
computation time is therefore also inversely proportional to η.
Remark 5.1. The computation time can be reduced by carrying out the iteration in stages,
starting with a relatively high value of the regularization parameter, and reducing it stepwise.
Such stagewise calculation is standard in the interior point method of linear programming (see for
instance [55]). A simple reduction scheme was applied to the problem data given above, consisting
of twelve stages in which the regularization parameter was reduced by the factor 1.5 at each
step to reach the final level 10−4, while the tolerance level was kept at 0.01 in all stages. The
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Figure 2: Results of computational experiment
stagewise computation required less than 1000 iterations to converge. Compared to the single-
stage calculation that starts immediately with the final value of the regularization parameter, this
implies a reduction of computation time by approximately a factor 25.
It is seen from the graphs of the criterion value (28) that the convergence is somewhat irregular.
This behavior becomes even more pronounced in the case of small examples. Of course, in such
examples there is not really a reason to apply regularization, since small instances can be easily
solved by any linear programming code. However, one may be able to get more insight into the
behavior of the iterative algorithm from simple examples. Consider a problem with the following
data:
(aij) =

0 1 0.5
0.7 0.5 0.3
0.6 0.3 0
 , r = [0.25 0.25 0.5], c = [0.2 0.6 0.2]. (29)
The convergence behavior of the iterative algorithm is shown in Fig. 3. As is evident from the
figure, the convergence towards the true solution is not smooth at all. There are long periods
in which little progress is made, and the algorithm appears almost trapped. On the other hand,
once the algorithm is close to the true solution, progress is quick; reducing the tolerance level
from 10−2, as used here, to levels close to machine accuracy would increase the total number of
iterations just by a few percent. Upon inspection of the intermediate results, it appears that the
phases of stagnation are linked to approximate solutions that, when used as a starting point for
the IPFP algorithm, would lead to cycling, due to the presence of too many zeros.6 The algorithm
6Precise conditions for convergence of the IPFP algorithm for non-negative weight matrices are given in [56].
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Figure 3: Convergence behavior in example (29)
passes closely by the following row-balanced matrices in succession:7
0 0.1875 0.0625
0.25 0 0
0.5 0 0
→

0 0.25 0
0 0 0.25
0.5 0 0
→

0 0.25 0
0 0 0.25
0.1875 0.3125 0
→

0 0.25 0
0 0.05 0.2
0.2 0.3 0
 .
Each of the first three matrices above has the property that it would cause the IPFP algorithm
to cycle; the final matrix corresponds to the true solution. When the regularization parameter
is reduced, the algorithm follows essentially the same path, but takes smaller steps, and hence
requires more iterations.
6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to establish a relationship between the optimal transport
problem on the one hand, and a certain class of multi-objective equilibrium problems with linear
reward functions on the other hand. This connection forms a natural complement to a similar
relationship which exists in the strictly concave / strictly convex case. By the availability of
this connection, it is possible to apply different perspectives to a given problem. This variety of
viewpoints has been illustrated in the context of regularization, where it was shown that entropic
regularization in the single-objective problem corresponds to isoelastic regularization in the multi-
objective framework. The ability to switch between different interpretations may be useful in
the design of algorithms. The curious behavior of the iterative algorithm for small values of the
regularization parameter seems worthy of further investigation.
7More precisely, the matrices given are of the form (x
(k)
ij ) where x
(k)
ij = (z
(k)
ij )
1/η , and the matrices
(
z
(k)
ij
)
are
the ones that are actually computed in the proposed algorithm.
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